Contraband is an issue in every local correctional and detention facility in the United States. Not only a nuisance and an embarrassment, in some cases it can be deadly, especially when it threatens the health and safety of the inmates and staff. Despite your facility’s diligence, there are those who are always searching for a crack in your security. As soon as your staff identifies and eliminates one avenue, these people have already found a new way to deliver contraband and other illegal items to inmates. All too often when there is a security breach, we seek to place blame, but take little or no action to prevent it from happening again. Simple solutions are sometimes overlooked, and any action taken is often short-lived and soon falls to the wayside. Everyone becomes super vigilant for a certain time, but then gradually eases back into complacency.
It Takes Just One Incident…
Recently, a cell phone was smuggled into our facility and I mentioned during roll call that if someone could get a cell phone in the facility, then they could also hide a gun. The phone had entered via a family member of an inmate worker during video visitation. It was hidden with some tobacco in the public restroom that the inmate was responsible for cleaning. We didn’t discover it until a few days later when another inmate notified us of the drop.
After the incident, I reviewed some of the inmate’s phone calls and discovered the whole plan had been arranged over the phone. Our biggest challenge was identifying the inmate who was assigned to clean, so I began to monitor the new man assigned to that detail. In one of his first phone calls after being assigned to the restroom, he said “They must really trust me, because it would be easy for me to bring something in here. Heck, I could get a gun back here if I wanted to.” It was as if he had heard what I said at roll call the previous morning. From that day forward, I ensured that area was inspected every morning before the inmate was allowed to clean. This was an obvious solution, so why had we not thought of it before? The reason: We were being reactive and not pro-active.
Although it is almost impossible to completely eliminate contraband from entering a correctional or detention facility, we can identify our current vulnerable points of entry and attempt to control or eliminate them. However, in order for this to work, a contraband control plan and procedures must be established and effectively implemented. This plan needs to be capable of evolving as new threats are identified or circumstances change. Here are a few ideas to ensure an evolving plan:
• Encourage staff to give input and make it easy for them to do so. As the plan is implemented, the ones actually doing the grunt work are often the best ones to tell you what is working and what needs to be changed or added.
• Implement staff ideas and feedback. Staff input is an excellent resource, but is often overlooked or even discouraged. You don’t want a policy that is blindly followed even though it is ineffective or counterproductive or simply not followed at all. Sadly, this is the fate of many policies that administrators attempt to establish. The ones sitting in a dusty binder on a shelf—or in a forgotten memo or e-mail—don’t help your staff or your facility.
• Most importantly, review, revisit, and revise the plan as necessary.
Another key to a truly effective contraband control plan is to include pro-active control methods. Seek to identify and eliminate the vulnerable areas before the detainees can find them. Remember the inmates have all day and night to watch, learn, and plan. They memorize your daily routines and procedures, scrutinize your officers, and learn your facility layout. They use all this information in their plans for retrieving contraband and obtaining illegal items. Facility administrators and staff need to do the same: watch, learn and plan.
This not only applies to your inmates but also to anyone who visits your facility. As my favorite FBI agent always said “Trust No One.” No one is above temptation or collusion given the right circumstances. Doctors, lawyers, preachers, nurses, and even law enforcement officers, have all been involved in the smuggling of contraband. Money, romantic relationships, or threats to individuals and their family are all powerful motivators.
Primary Sources
There are three primary sources of entry for contraband, and each needs to be examined and addressed individually. The sources vary from the public to detainee either directly or indirectly, straight from the street by the detainee, and delivery by officer or other staff.
Friends and Family Members
Friends and family members of incarcerated persons are a major source of contraband. This is especially true if the facility allows contact visits or if inmates are on work detail. Anytime an inmate is allowed in an area where a member of the public has access, there is a danger of inmates obtaining prohibited items. All of these areas must be closely examined in consideration of contraband prevention. First, review how to make it more difficult for items to be left or given to inmates. This could be anything as simple as removing or relocating a public trash can or as complicated as implementing video or no contact visitation.
Next, limit areas of public access as much as possible. Scrutinize your public areas as an inmate would. Is there a place where an item can be hidden and then retrieved later? If so, then either eliminate or move that hiding spot immediately. If that is not possible, make it part of the daily routine to have an officer check that area before an inmate has access to it. If contact visitation is allowed:
• Search the public area before the contact visitation.
• Closely monitor that area during the visitation.
• Search the inmates after visitation as thoroughly as possible.
If a member of the public is caught providing contraband, they should be prosecuted to serve as a deterrent—word spreads quickly!
Take advantage of any legal monitoring methods that are available, such as reading inmate mail and e-mail and listening to recorded phone conversations, especially if an inmate is under suspicion. These highly underused tools are important, because inmates will frequently tell on themselves when they are involved in illegal activities. Although most inmates know that we can monitor them through mail and phone, they either don’t think we really do or believe they are smart enough to talk in code. Their “code” is usually not well-written or hard to decipher.
Outside Contacts
Outside contacts also use indirect methods to deliver contraband. Examples of this include sending drugs through the mail or hiding contraband in personal items delivered to inmates, such as personal shoes or medical devices. Most of facilities are already aware of these tactics and have established common practices for handling. However, adding these daily practices to a written plan or policy helps to ensure that everyone is using the utmost precautions.
Here are a few suggestions:
• Think outside the box in order to stay one step ahead of the contraband. Rest assured there is an inmate version of MacGyver who is thinking in a similar manner. For example, the use of drones to fly over and drop off contraband on an inmate exercise yard or work area is most likely the next problem. Although I have not heard of this happening yet, consumer drones are becoming more readily available and advanced. Eventually, one inventive person will attempt it.
• Watch and learn. Just as inmates target vulnerable officers and staff, you also can learn to identify the inmates and public who may be smuggling in contraband.
• Review past incidents and determine ways to prevent similar occurrences in the future. Add changes to your practices to eliminate as many entry points as possible and then develop procedures to cover any unavoidable vulnerability.
Of the three methods, public-to-inmate contraband transfers are probably both the most common and the easiest to control or eliminate. With effort and persistence, this is where planning will be most effective for stopping contraband. Unfortunately, the other two methods for contraband entry are a little trickier, each for their own reasons.
New Detainees
Contraband brought in by a new detainee, whether from an arrest or transferred from another facility, is sometimes the hardest to prevent. No matter what efforts a facility takes, the best result is most likely a slow but steady leak of small amounts of tobacco or drugs. With legal restraints against strip searches and the willingness of people to shove items in the most unimaginable places, this type of delivery is very difficult to prevent. Informing all inmates that smuggling contraband into the facility will result in criminal charges only discourages a few attempts.
The human body is one of the most effective vessels for hiding restricted items. Although initial pat downs are effective, this procedure does not always find everything. The cargo capacity of body cavities is relatively small, but it is surprising what can fit in certain cavities. In fact, handguns in the body cavity are not unheard of. Fortunately, most individuals are not ambitious enough to attempt anything of that scale. Small containers or baggies of drugs or tobacco are far more common deliveries via this method. If an inmate can fit a bottle of pills in a body cavity, then a pocket knife would be just as easy. For example, a female inmate once smuggled in a toy derringer in her vagina. It wasn’t found until it fell out as she was being placed in the restraint chair. Although a metal toy, it could have as easily been a real gun. She claimed she kept it there for self-defense. Unfortunately, some hiding places still require nothing short of a doctor’s exam to locate.
When legally permitted, strip searches upon admission are the most effective prevention against inmate harbored items. The searches should be conducted in a legal and professional manner. Specific circumstances must be clearly laid out as to when a strip search is permitted and what the procedure involves. Because strip searches are the source of many lawsuits (some of which have seen millions of dollars rewarded in judgments), this policy also needs to be closely scrutinized by an attorney familiar with the associated laws and court cases.
If strip searches are not permissible, all articles of the inmate’s personal clothing must be retrieved before he or she is issued a facility uniform. This can be done from behind a partial partition. Use of a metal detector is another good way to find hidden knives or other small weapons before sending inmates to population. Specific guidelines for initial and dress out searches need to be covered in the contraband plan or SOP. Any personal items inmates are allowed to keep must be checked thoroughly. Once dressed out, the inmate is never placed in the same holding cell where initially kept, because they can easily hide items in the cell and retrieve them after they are dressed out.
Law Enforcement Officers
Although the last method is one that no one wants to contemplate, it is also a scenario that most people in this profession either have experienced or will experience if they stay in corrections long enough. That a fellow officer would betray coworkers and dishonor the profession for an inmate is not something we ever want to experience. I try not to encourage the “us versus them” attitude, but in this area that is how it must be. There is “us” and there is “them” and you don’t cross that line unless you want to join them. Many people have already (or will at some point) cross that line. Their reasons for betrayal can be for something as small as a $20 bill or a big as murder.
Just as inmates are always looking for cracks in the security, they are also analyzing staff for any weaknesses. It has been said that everyone has a price; the inmates are simply waiting for a staff member who has a price they can afford. Even though training on inmate con games prevents some of these incidents, it all comes down to the integrity of each member of your facility’s staff. By searching staff or placing harsh restrictions on them as if they are inmates will only sustain the types of attitudes that cause people to cross over the line of betrayal. Low morale and a lack of respect for leadership are breeding grounds for corruption.
One of the first and most valuable lessons learned in this profession is that people behave the way they are treated. Start treating your staff like inmates and some will start behaving like them—and the good ones will simply leave. Let there be no doubt among your staff that they are appreciated, but once they cross that line then they will prosecuted to the full extent of the law. As mentioned earlier in the article in regard to inmates, watch and learn as well with your staff. If you look closely enough, you can see the same qualities and behaviors that the inmates are looking for.
In addition to officers, there are other people whom we usually consider as “good guys” who have the potential to “cross the line.” Civilian staff and volunteers are also susceptible to the same motives and influences as the officers. Attorneys, clergy members, doctors, and nurses all have the opportunity to deliver contraband, whether purposefully or simply by accident. An item may be left within an inmate’s reach and or accidentally dropped where an inmate can find it or when a back is turned.
The “no contact” alternatives are ideal, but not always feasible. Create a FAQ or hand out a set of guidelines as to what is expected of civilians and volunteers when they enter the facility, include what they can or cannot do and the dangers of inadvertently providing inmates with contraband. In the sidebar are excerpts from a guideline developed for attorneys who visit my facility. I wrote this a few years ago after my facility had an issue with an attorney who appeared to lack commonsense. Sometimes, facilities need to state the obvious and provide very exact directions. Usually staff are familiar with the attorneys and clergy who visit frequently; however, if someone new enters your facility, verify their identity and watch them a little more closely. Do a little cyber-vetting on them. Google their name or visit their Facebook page to ensure they are who they say they are.
Conclusion
Inmates have all day and night to work on their plan. Don’t be discouraged when they find a new way to smuggle in contraband. Instead, use their plans as a way to help you discover your next vulnerability. With close observation, you may be able to stop an inmate before the contraband leaves his possession. Encourage everyone on your team to share their ideas and observations. Use monitoring tools at your disposal to investigate before an event happens. Remind your officers, staff, and volunteers that contraband can be deadly. If inmates gain access to a cell phone, then they can also hide a gun or a knife. Scrutinize, analyze, watch, learn, and listen to your inmates. Then use what you learn to develop and maintain your plan and procedures and keep your facility safe for everyone.
Anthony Cox is a 20-plus year veteran of the Coweta County Detention Center in Newnan, Georgia. He can be contacted at acox@coweta.ga.us.
The post Watch, Listen, and Learn: Contraband Prevention Plans appeared first on American Jail Association.
